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THE MODELS OF ECONOMIC CHOICE THEORY: 
A PARAD IGM FOR NON-ECONOMISTS 
1. M. Heineke* 
Introduction 
The ultimate goal of social science is to explain individual 
and group behavior within given institutional constraints. 
In practice this means developing models which effectively 
describe and predict human behavior. Recent experi ence 
has shown a particular approach to modeling individual be-
havior to be especially useful . The approach in question has 
been developed by economists and consists of using the 
analytical structure of utility theory to focus attention on 
the determinants of individual choice and then analyzing the 
responsiveness of individual choices to changes in these 
determinants. The success of model building in this format 
is evidenced by the fact that a major portion of micro-
economic theory is now known as choice theory. 
Choice theoretic problems are naturally partitioned 
into two classes: Problems in which the consequences of 
alternative courses of action (choices) are deterministic and 
problems in which choices are associated with stochastic 
consequences. The characteristic of choice theory p roblems 
that differentiates them from typical decision theory prob-
lems is the fact that the models of choice theory are 
qualitative. The abundance of qualitative models in the 
social sciences in general and in economics in particular is 
due primarily to a lack of knowledge about the form of the 
functions involved in the various models and the consequent 
unwillingness on the part of theorists to specify any but 
their most general properties (e.g. convexity or concavity). 
Although the explanat01y power of qualitative models is a 
far cry from that of the models of classical physics, many 
interesting questions may be addressed. 
Jt is the purpose of this paper to provide a fairly 
detailed analysis of a specific model of individual choice 
with the inten tion of exposing the apparatus of choice 
theory to non-economists. Formally, the model to be 
presented is representative of a broad class of models in 
economics and assumes optimizing behavior on the part of 
the individual agent. l n the present context , "optimizing 
behavior" is taken to mean that the agent chooses from 
among alternative courses of action in such a manner that 
the particular alterna tive(s) chosen leaves the agent as "well 
off' as possible. Questions of primary interest include the 
response of an agent's cho ices to changes in policy para-
meters and other underlying "conditions." 
In what follows we will be studying a particular kind of 
criminal behavior. Specifically, we model the ignition 
decision problem confronting an arsonist. This choice 
reflects our desire to illustrate the scope of the analytical 
framework utilized and a t the same time to provide an 
interesting example of an activity where the stochastic 
natu re of consequences is an essential ingredient in the 
decision problem. 
For choice problems with stochastic consequences, 
economists have come to rely heavily upon the expected 
utility theorem of von Neumann and Morgenstern.l Tn a 
nutshell , the expected utility theorem consists of a set of 
axioms concerning the structure of an individual's pref-
erences, which if satisfied, imply that choices among 
alternative uncertain courses of action are made as if the 
individual were maximizing expected. utility. This is not 
I The classical reference to this theorem is von Neumann and 
Morgenstern r 1944 I. A more recent proof may be found in Arrow 
[ 1965 J, Chapter I. 
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the place fo r a discussion of these axioms.2 It suffices to 
say that they are quite general and imply the individual's 
preferences are representable; that is, there exists a function 
which assigns a real number to the conseq uence of each 
possible act ion in such a way as to reflect the individual's 
preferences. Economists call such a function a utility func-
tion .. The expected utility theorem provides a powerful 
analytical framework for modeling choice problems unde r 
uncertainty, a framework utilized in this paper. 
In the first section of the paper our analysis is focused 
on the case where punish men t for arson is by fine only. 
The sensitivity of incendiary ac tivity to several policy 
changes is investigated. ln the following sec tion , prison 
sentences are added to fines as a possible punishment and the 
effects o f the sa me policy changes are explored . The effect 
of including both sentences and fines as penalties is to 
further complicate penalty options, the reby reducing the 
number of unambiguous results obtainable. The final section 
of the paper contains a brief methodological discussion on 
modeling human behavior. 
A Choice TI1eoretic Model of Arson 
The question at hand is how to best represent the decision 
problem confronting an arsonist. An economist is likely to 
consider the arsonist 's problem as a time allocation problem 
with uncertain consequences. ln particular, how much time 
will be al located to the planning and execution of ignitions 
if the arsonist acts in his "bes t in terest ," as he sees it .3 
And this is precisely the tack taken in this paper. Igni tions 
are viewed as the outcome of a time allocation decision with 
uncertain consequences. Outcomes are uncertain since once 
a fire is started the individual may be apprehended and 
subjec ted to a fine , a prison term, or both. Because tra-
di tional policy prescriptions designed to de ter arson (or for 
that matter any type of criminal behavio r) invariably 
include increases in prosecution and penalties, we will be 
interested in determining whethe r such prescriptions follow 
from o ur model of individual choice .4 
2 l)isc ussio ns o f th is thctJrem an d a lternati ve sets of axio ms 
whic h lead t o the maximizat ion o f ex pected ut ilit y m ay be fo und 
in the previo us t wo references and in Marschak 11 950 1, Herstein 
and Mil nor J l 953 1 and Marscha k and Rad ne r I 1972 1. An easy to 
read discussio n o f human cho ice th eory m ay be fo und in McFadden 
(1974 1. 
3Arso n may be comm itted either fo r " fun " or fo r econo mic gain 
(e.g. insurance payoffs). So as to give a unified in terpretatio n 
thro ugho ut , we assu me the individual 's mo tives are non-eco no mic. 
The fac t that an arsonis t 's motives are no n-economic does no t 
m ean he or she experiences no econo mic repercussions f ro m arso n . 
Indeed . if apprehended a nd convicted , the fine o r prison sentence 
o r both and the earnings and o pportunit ies fo regone from " loss of 
name" a nd for t ime in pr ison, may constitute a severe e co nomic loss. 
But at the sa me ti me , the fir e may have been s tar ted for " fu n"-a 
no n-eco nomic mo t ive. 
4 For a detailed methodological discussio n on modeling criminal 
behavio r , see Block and Heineke 11975 1. 
34 
The cen tral concept in an analysis of time allocation under 
uncertainty is the individual's von Neumann-Morgenstern 
(N-M) utility function . This funct ion contains all the 
needed in formation pertaining to the individual's evaluat ion 
of the various "states of the world ," and p rovides a ranking 
of states in terms of their relative wo rth as perceived by 
the individual. The N-M utility functio n is denoted as 
U (JV , L), where W represents the individual's wealth and L 
his time allocation to arson related activities (incendiaty 
activity).S We assume that the u til ity funct ion is differentia-
ble, that the individual prefers more wealth to less, Uw 
> 0 and th at planning and star ting fires is a desirable 
activity in the eyes of an arsonist, UL > 0 (see f.n . 3). 
The foll owing definitions will be used: 
D (L) - the damage caused by a fire . Damage is a fu nc-
tion of the amount of time an incendiarist 
spends planning and executing ignitions and 
is assumed to be a differen tiable fu nction of 
L. lt seems reasonable to assume that the 
more time spent the highe r will be the 
damages. Th at is, D'(L) > 0 . Obviously , 
D (0) = 0. 
p - the individual's estimate of the p robability 
of apprehension if a fire is started.6 
w o - the individ ual's " initial" wealth . 
F - the fine as a multiple of fire damages, F > 0 . 
W - w o - FD (L), the individ ual's wealth if ap-
prehended after start ing a fi re causing damage 
D (L). 
According to the expected utility theorem, the lime 
allocation decision will be made by the individual as if it 
were the solution to 
( I ) max {(1 - p) U r.yvo , L) + pU r.yvo- FD (L), L)} 
L 
" subject to the condi tions that W ;a. 0 and 0 <; L <; L, where 
'Lis the maximum amount of time which could be all oca ted 
S For a general analysis o f the alloca tion of t ime under u ncer ta inty , 
see Block and He in eke [ 1 973] . 
6 11 is oft en reasonable to assume p = p (L) w it h p' ( L) >o. Although 
many of the results reported below wou ld rema in uncha nged under 
this spec ificatio n , so as not to needlessly com plica te what is essen t ial-
ly an expository paper, I have assu med p to he indepe ndent of L. 
It sho uld also he noted t hat p ma y not be the " true " probabi lity 
of appre hensio n. All that is needed to model the arsonist's decision 
problem is his subjec tive evaluation of h is chances of being caught -
our parame ter p. An interesting question w hich is outside the scope 
of this paper, involves th is relation between p and t he "tr ue" value 
of p , say , P. This re lationship is especiall y importa nt in lawenforce-
ment s ince the contro l variable fo r a law enforce me nt agenc y is P 
and no t p . See Ul ock and Lind 11975 l for a discussion of th is topic. 
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to arson and arson-related activity. The expression within 
the brackets { } in (1) is the expected utility the individual 
derives from L "hours" of arson related activity, given an 
initial wealth of wo. The arsonist's decision problem in 
this setting is to choose L such that this expression is 
maximized.? We will designate L* as the solution to (1).8 
1l1e necessa1y condition for a relative maxima in L is 
then9 
(2) I 2 I 2 I-IL=(l -p) UL + p [Uw (-FD)+UL ] ~0. 
where H = (1-p) U (WO, L) + pU (WO-FD(L), L), Ul 
U (WO, L) and U2 = U (WO-FD(L), L).. This inequality is 
the fundamental concept in our analysis since it determines 
the time the individual will spend at arson related activities. 
Consequently, most of the rest of the paper may be thought 
of as a series of operations designed to ferret out the infor-
mation implicit in (2) . 
Let 's begin by considering policies designed to deter arson. 
Intuition and the "conventional wisdom" lead one to suspect 
that increasing p or F or both should result in decreases in 
incendiarism. The implicit reasoning behind such a con-
clusion is simple: Increases in either of these policy 
variables has the effect of increasing the expected costs of 
starting fires and hence should tend to deter incendiarism. 
Unfortunately, such reasoning is not valid in general as 
examination of inequality (2) indicates. Since F and p enter 
both uw2 and UL 2 it will not be possible to determine the 
response of L to changes in p or F without fur ther analysis. 
fn ;my event , it will generally not be desirable to adopt 
policies which completely deter incendiarism (if such 
policies exist). The reason for this is that investigating the 
origins of fires, apprehending those who start them, and 
then convicting them in a court of law is a resource con-
suming process. lt will be desirable to plow resources into 
these activities only as long as increases in expenditure 
yield even greater decreases in losses. Typically , the optimal 
policy will be to tolerate some arson and, in this case, the 
marginal response of L to policy changes is of interest. 
To explore this question in more depth, we consider the 
responsiveness of incendiary activity to changes in wealth, 
the severity of punishment, and the level of enforcement. 
7Sincc any value chosen for L induces a probability density funct ion 
on W, the decis ion problem may be viewed as one of choosing among 
probability densities such that expected utility is maximum. 
Bwe assume the "upper bound" constraint on L is non-binding, i.e., 
0 ~ L* < 't, since it seems highly unlikely that "aU" of the 
individual's time would be allocated to L, given the nature of the 
activity. 
9As usual, we adopt the practice of indicating partial derivatives of a 
function with subscripts. So for example HL= ilH/aL, I-I LL =a2H/aL2 
and ULw=a2u/aLaw. 
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The Method of Analysis 
The question now arises as to how one goes about calcu-
lating the responsiveness of incendiary activity to these 
various parameter changes. Clearly we are not interested in 
the responsiveness of just any old value of L. Instead our 
interest lies in how L *, the optimal value of L, responds 
to changes in wealth, the severity o f punishment, and the 
level of enforcement. Now if a continuously differentiable 
function rp exists such that 
(3) L* = rp (p, F, WO), 
then the answers to these questions may be in terpreted as 
being given by the signs of au;awo, aL*/aF and aL* jap, 
respectively .1 0 
For the important case where H has a "regular," 
"internal" relative maxima a t L * such a funct ion rp does 
indeed exist and is unique. Il This follows from the hypothe-
sis of the implicit func tion theorem which, in the case at 
hand , requires only that the Jacobian associated with 
equation (2) not vanish at L *. For a regular, internal 
maxima this is assured. l 2 
Economists would call (3) the reduced form of the model 
given in equation (1). In general, reduced form equations 
are the "sol utions" of a model in which aU endogenous 
variables have been expressed as a funct ion of the model's 
parameters. In this context, the purpose of the present 
analysis is to sign the partial derivatives of the reduced form 
equation. In addition, it should be pointed out that an 
analysis of the type we have sketched does not require 
explicit solution for L* , since merely knowing that the 
function rp exists allows us to solve for the reduced form 
derivatives. 
lOin equation (3) we have represented only parameters which 
appear explicitly in our model, the implicit parameters in the 
utility function and D (L) being subsumed into rp. If we were willing 
to furthur specify U or D, say for example as to the class to which 
one or both of these functions belong, then the parameters associated 
with these classes of functions would also appear explicitly in (3). 
I lwe use the words "regular" and "internal" to mean HLL < 0 
at L* and L*> 0, respectively. "Regularity" of the maximum insures 
HLL < 0 and not, e.g., I-ILL = 0 and HLLLL <o, while "internal" 
solutions restrict our attention to analyzing only the behavior of 
individuals who actuaUy spend some lime at arson and related 
activities, i.e. , L* f: 0. We maintain these assumptions throughout. 
Notice also that the fact that r/> is unique is crucial. If not, one 
would have a different derivat ive for each possible function r/>which 
would greatly complicate the analysis. 
12The Jacobian associated with (2) at L*, is of course merely I-ILL 
evaluated at L*. Hence, as long as the maxima is "internal" and 
"regular," HLL < 0 at L* and the Jacobian does not van ish . 
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Incendiary Activity and Wealth 
The first question to be examined is the response of 
incendiary activity to changes in the level of wealth wo 
As we have seen, this may be accomplished for "inte;·nal'; 
solutions by differentiating equation (2) with respect to 
wo. In which case 
(4) oL*tawo = [pFD'UWw -(1-p)ULw -pU[w ] /HLL 
Although the denominator of (4), HLL. must be negative 
for a regular, interior relative maxima and p, F and D' are 
each positive, signing (4) will require, at a minimum, some 
ass umption about the signs of Uw~ and EULw .1 3 
The function ULW measures the sensitivity of UL to 
changes in wealth, where UL represents the "enjoyment" 
the arsonist derives from planning and executing ignitions 
(at the margin). The question to be answered at th.is point 
is what effect small changes in wealth have upon the 
marginal psychic rewards to arson. It would seem to be 
acceptable as a first approximation to assume that these 
psychic rewards are invariant in wealth. The sign of aL*/awo 
then depends upon Uww. In models in which the conse-
quences of actions are uncertain, the sign of Uww has 
special significance-the import of which is the subject of 
the following digression. 
Digression on Sign [Uww] 
ln economic theory the sign of Uww is a measure of 
the agent's behavior toward risk. To explore this concept 
briefly consider a N-M utility function with only one argu-
ment, wealth , say V (W). As we have noted previously , an 
obvious restriction on Vis Vw > 0. But what interpretation 
is to be given to the rate of change of Vw? The answer 
to this question depends upon the agent's preferences 
among prospects possessing varying degrees of risk. To see 
this consider an agent with init ial wealth wo who is offered 
a be t which involves winning or losing an amount h with 
probabilities p and 1-p respectively. The agent will be 
willing to accept the bet for values of p sufficiently large 
(certainly for p=l) and will refuse it if pis small (certainly 
for p=O). Now consider the special case where p = .5 (a fair 
bet). The choice is then between a certain wealth of wo 
and a random wealth taking on values of WO..h and Woth 
with probability .5 each. A risk aJJerse individual is defined 
as one who prefers the certain income. In terms of the 
expected utility hypothesis, the utility associated with the 
certain wealth wo is strictly greater than the expected 
utility associated with the fair gamble, i.e . 
1 3The symbol E represen ts the expecta tion o per~tor. 
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(5) V (WO) > (~) V (WG.h) + (~) V (WO+h) 
or 
(6) V (WO)- V (WO- h) > V (WO +h) - V (WO) 
The utility differences corresponding to equal changes 
in wealth are decreasing as wealth .increases. Thus the 
utility function of a risk averter is characterized by the 
condition that Vw is strictly decreasing in wealth, i.e. 
Vww < 0. Similar reasoning leads to the definitions of 
agents who are risk neutral, Vww = 0 and agents with 
a preference for risk, Vww > 0. If the utility function con-
tains several arguments the agent is said, for example , to 
display conditional risk aversion if the second partial deriva-
tive with respect to the wealth argument is negative. (The 
agent's aversion to risk is conditional upon given values of the 
other arguments in the utility function.) Finally, we note 
that meaningful results using the expected utility theorem 
require that the individual's utility function be bounded 
fro m above and below and that boundedness implies the 
individual must be predominan tly a risk averter.l4 Jn 
addition, since both risk neutrality and risk preference 
seem to be at odds with most observed behavior, analysts 
usually assume that individuals are risk averse, an assump· 
tion we shall accept. l 5 
We are now in a position to sign equation (4). The 
assumptions that the agent is risk averse and that ULW = 0 
implyl6 
(4') aL*tawo > o 
lf fines are the only form of punishment, increases in the 
level of wealth lead to increased incendiary activity! Th.is 
conclusion obviously assumes tha 1 "tastes" do not change 
with wealth . For example, if increased wealth were auto-
matically accompanied by an "emotional ma turity" that 
made arson repugnant, then inequality (4') would not hold. 
l3ut , since there is little evidence that wealth induces such 
cha racter t ransformations, we conclude that as long as 
incendiary act ivity is punishable only by fine, 1 ransfer 
payments of any kind will exacerbate the problem of 
incendiary ignition s. As is implicit in the last statement, 
punishment which includes prison sentences may alter this 
conclusion, a point returned to below. 
14See Arrow [ 1965, p. 93 1 for a discussion of th is point. 
I S Note that risk aversion in wealth, Uww < 0, in no way prevents 
!he arsonist from being a risk taker in L, u11 > 0. For a d iscussion 
o f behavior toward r isk in arg u ments of U o ther than wea lth , see 
Hlock and Lind [ 197 5 J. 
l6Tite lwo assu mptions, U1w = 0 and Uww < 0, wi ll be retained 
lhroughout. 
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Jncendimy Activity and Fines 
We next examine the response of incendiary activity to 
changes in the severity of the punishment. In this section, 
the "severity of punishment" is given by the magnitude of 
the fine. The response of the arsonist's t ime allocation to 
changes in th e magnitude of the fine is given by 
2 2 I 2 I (6) 3L*I3F =(pD1UW )IHLL +Dp(ULW -FDUww) HLL 
Under the assumptions adopted, both teims in this sum are 
negative and 
(6 1) 3L*I3F < 0. 
Increasing the severity of monetary punishments has a 
deterrent effect on incendiary activity. 
It should be kept in mind that this result does not 
imply that it will be possible to reduce incendiarism to 
zero or to any other arbitrary level by increasing the fine 
sufficiently . The reason for this lies in the limit on the 
magnitude of fines which is imposed by the non-negativity 
constraint on wealth. Even if wo is interpreted as the dis-
counted life-time earnings of the individual , the same 
problem may appear. Of course, the "more fun" it is to 
start fires (the larger is EUL), the more difficult it will 
be to deter such activity via fines or any other means. 
lncendimy Activity and Enforcement 
We now invest igate the response of incendiary activity 
to changes in the level of enforcement. The enforcement 
variable is p , the probability of apprehension once a fire 
is started and, like F , is a policy variable in the model. 
Differentiation of equation (2) yields 
1 l I 2 I (7) 3L*Iop = (UL - UL + FD Uw ) HLL 
It can be shown that 
(7 1) 3L*I3p <O 
independent of any assumption about the individual's 
preferences other than behavior in accordance with the 
axioms of the expected utility theorem-_1 7 In particular, 
no assumption about ULW is needed , nor is any assumption 
needed about the individual's behavior toward risk. 
Enforcement Versus Fines: The Relative Effectiveness 
It has been shown that increases in either the probability 
of apprehension or the severity of the fine will have a 
17To see this, note that for internal solutions, the first o rder 
conditions may be written as Ul = p[ uL -u[ + FD 1UJr I_ Since 
uL > 0, the right hand s ide of th is expression is positive. But the 
right hand side is the numerator of {7) an'd hence 3L•t3p <o. 
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deterrent effect on incendiary activity. The obvious extension 
-of the analysis is to ask, "which is most effective?" That is, 
would a one-percent increase in p or a one-percent increase 
in FD (by increasing F) have a greater impact in reducing 
incendiarism? Remarkably, even at the present level of 
generality , this question can be answered. 
To see this, consider a simultaneous change in p and 
FD which leaves the expected punishment unchanged, i.e. 
d(pFD) = 0. Increasing p and decreasing F so that expected 
punishment is unchanged is a formal method of determining 
which of the two policy variables has the larger dete rrent 
capability. The requirement on the expected fine is then 
d (pFD) = pdFD + FdpD = 0 
so tha t 
dFidp =-(Fip) 
is tl1e condition tl1at insures that expected punishment is 
unchanged when p and F are both varied . Calculation of 
3L*I3p, from (3), when t his condition holds yie lds: 
(8) aL* 
ap 
d(pFD)=O 
aL* aL* F 
= - - - (- ) 
ap aF p 
The terms 3L*I3F and 3L*Iap were derived and signed 
above in equations (6 1) and (7'). Since each is negative, 
3L*I3p and -aL*I3F (F/p) are of opposite sign. If the sign 
of equation (8) is determinable, then one of these t wo 
opposing effects domina te- which one depends upon the 
sign. 
Using equations (6) and (7), equation (8) may be reWI·it -
ten as 
(8') aL* 
ap 
and hence 
(8") 3L* 
ap 
I 2 I 2 2 
= [UL - UL +OF (FD Uww - ULW )] IHLL 
d(pFD)=O 
>O 
d(pFD)=O 
Percentage increases in the probabili ty of apprehension will 
deter incendiarism less than will equal percentage increases 
in fi~es_l8 This important result holds for risk averse 
individuals for which ULW ;:;, 0 and in penalty systems 
which are based on fines only. 
The results shown as inequal ities (4 1), (6'), (7') and 
(8") rest upon several assumptions about individual prefer-
I 8That is, the secontl term in equation {8) dominates the first. 
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ences and underscore an important, although somewhat 
pedantic point: Policy recommendations in general, and 
policy recommendations designed to deter arson in particu-
lar, rest upon assumptions about the preferences of 
individuals. For example, in a penalty system based on 
fines only, a sufficient condition for the recommendation 
that the probability of apprehension be increased as a 
means of deterring arsonists, is merely that individuals act 
in accordance to the axioms of the expected utility 
theorem. No other preference information is necessary. 
On the other hand, deducing the deterrent capabilities of 
fines requires additional preference restrictions. For example, 
for risk averse individuals, unambiguous deterrence via fines 
requires ULW ~ 0. 
Prison Sentences and Fines as 
Punishment for Incendiarism 
Since the wealth of an individual imposes limits upon 
the monetary penalty which can be assessed, one might be 
tempted to conjecture that a system of penalties incorpora-
ting both fines and prison sentences would be a more effec-
tive deterrent. This question is briefly explored in tllis 
section as an extension of the previous model. Jt is assumed 
that both fines and prison sentences are possible penalties 
if an arsonist is apprehended. 
The individual's utility function is now U (W , L, S) where 
S represents the time length of a prison sentence. Obviously, 
Us < 0. The expected utility associated with L "hours" 
on incendiary activity is 
(9) (1-p) U (Wo, L, 0) + pU (WO- FD(L), L, S) 
The individual will choose the amount of time to spend at 
incendiary activity as if (9) were being maximized. The 
level of incendiary activity is determined by 
1 2 { ') 2 2 f'] (10) (1-p)UL +p [Uw ,-FD +UL +Us ~ 0 
where sentence length is assumed to be an increasing function 
of L, i.e. S = f(L) and f'(L) > 0.19 As before, the 1"educed 
form equation associated with (10) is a unique , continuous-
ly differentiable function of p, F and wo. 
Calling the solution to (10), LO, the three "policy" 
derivatives from above arc now repeated in this more 
general context:20 
19Superscri pts o n functions indicate t h e poin t w here the function 
has been evaluated. 
20Again , only "regular ," " internal " solutions In (10) are consid -
ered in what follows. 
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(II) aLojawo = [pFD'U~ - pf'V§w - E(ULW)] /HLL 
2 2 1 2 (1 2)aL0/3F = [pD1UW ] /HLL + Dp [ULW + f Usw 
- FD'uirw ] /HLL 
1 2 1 2 1 2 ] / (13)3L0/3p= [UL -VL +FDUw -fUs HLL 
The only unsigned term in these expressions is Usw for 
which there would seem to be an obvious choice, viz. 
Usw < 0- increasing the length of a prison sentences 
"hurts" more the wealthier one is. Or, equivalently, in-
creases in sentence length become more disagreeable the 
more that is _given up. 
Inspection of equations (11) and (12) reveals that 
without further preference information the effects on 
incendiaty activity of changes in wealth levels and the 
effects of changes in the amount of the fine are inherently 
ambiguous when penalties are a mixture of fines and prison 
sentences. As we saw, in a penalty system based upon 
fines only increased wealth and increased fines have in-
centive and disincentive effects respectively on incendiary 
activity. But if the penalty system is a mixture of fines 
and sentences, the effects of the same wealth and fine 
changes are qualitatively ambiguous. Of course, increases in , 
say, fines may deter incendiary activity but at this level of 
generality it is impossible to say for sure. 
Although aLojawo is qualitatively ambiguous, equation 
(11) does reveal one interesting conclusion that can be drawn 
about policies directed toward changing wealth levels: rf 
incendiarism is punishable only by prison sentences (F = 0) 
then 
(11 1) 3L0/3WO < 0 
Increases in affluence unambiguously deter incendiary 
activity. Wealth increases have incentive effects in a fme-
onJy penalty structure and disincentive effects in a sentence-
onJy penalty structure. This result not only explains the 
ambiguity of tl1e mixed fine-sentence penalty structure, 
but also has interesting policy implications. 
The only remaining policy variable in the model is the 
enforcement variable, p. lt was shown above that increases 
in the probability of apprehension had deterrent effects on 
incendiary activity if punishment was by fine. This result 
required no preference information other than behavior 
in accordance with the expected utility theorem. According 
to equation ( 13), the same conclusion may be drawn about 
increases in the probability of apprehension in a mixed 
fines-sentences penalty structure! That is, 21 
(13 1) aLojap < 0 
2 1 The proof of this s tatement is identical to that presented for 
inequality (7 1). 
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This remarkable result requires only that arsonists be 
expected utility maximizers. So, whether penalties are fines 
or a mix of fines and prison te rms, increases in the 
probabil ity of apprehension will unambiguously deter arson. 
Some Concluding Remarks on Modeling Human Behavior 
In this fi nal section we attempt to pinpoint the diffe rence 
between the approach to modeling taken here and what 
might be called the " Forrester (World Dynamics) Approach." 
Our approach has been to construct a model using rather 
fundamental behavioral hypotheses (e .g. individuals maxi-
mize expected uti lity, are risk averse, etc .) . The basic model 
was then restricted to the ex tent possible using whatever 
theoretical and a pri01i informa tion one has (e.g. Uww 
< 0 and Uw > 0). Tn general, the purpose of an analysis 
such as ours is to utili ze the behavioral hypotheses and 
available restrictions on the model to deduce as much 
information as possible about reduced form equations.22 
The motivat ion for this approach is evident: The funda-
mental explanatory equations of the model (the reduced 
form) are directly linked to explicit underlying propositions 
about individual behavior. Consequently, one is able to 
use the derived properties of reduced form equations confi· 
dent of their implications concerning the underlying pref-
erences of individuals. 
On the other hand, one can assume the existence of 
reduced form equations without ever bothering to build a 
model from which the equations follow .23 In reference to 
the above model, one could very credibly assume that the 
level of incendiary act ivity is a function of the probabili ty 
of arrest, the severity of punishment and the individual's 
wealth position. Superficially one then has equation (3) 
above, without all the th eoretical niceties, a circumstance 
particularly appealing to those in a hurry to "solve" real 
world problems. Of course, since this equation has not been 
derived from a model , one is forced to make ad hoc 
assumptions about its propert ies. And at this point serious 
problems emerge. Since one has no model, one has no way 
of knowing what implications any assumed properties of 
the reduced form carry for underlying preferences. In 
general, one is for tunate if any given set of ad hoc as~ 
sumpti ons about the reduced form of a model is not 
mutually contrad ictory in reference to .a reasonable class 
of models. 
To illustrate several of these arguments, let's re turn 
once again to the model analyzed in this paper. If one 
were to begin an analysis by assuming the existence of 
22 ln th is paper, a ttent io n was focused primaril y on determina tion 
of but one propert y of the red uced form - t he s ign of par tial 
d erivat ives. 
23 Fo r e xample, see Ra bow ) 1974 ) in wh ich th e signs o f par t ial 
deri vatives a nd the functional fo r m o f w hat are essenti all y reduced 
fo rm eq ua t ions ha ve been speci fied . Other examples are plentifu l. 
The "mod el" in Forrest er's World Dynamics 11 97 I I is p r imarily a 
collectio n of aggregated red uced fo rm equat io ns which have been 
assigned ad /roc p ro per t ies. For a detailed analysis o f the Forrester 
mod el , see Nordha us [I 974). 39 
equation (3), then ad hoc considerations would undoubted -
ly call for assigning negative signs to each of the derivatives 
aLjap, aL/aF and aLtawo. But, as we saw above, this 
follows in general only for a Ljap. Without further restric-
tions on U the other two derivatives are unsigned. And 
after the model has been restricted in what would seem 
to be the most reasonable manner, we found that aL/aF 
is unambiguously negat ive only when penalties consist of 
ftnes alone. If both fines and sentences are adm itted as 
penalties, aLtaF is inherently ambiguous. Tn addition, 
we found that sign [aLtawo] depended even more critically 
on the penalty specification. If ftnes were the only type 
of punishment, then incend iary activity increases in wealth 
(a Ltawo > 0),24 while if the only punishment is a prison 
term, incendiary activity decreases in wealth (aLtawo < 
0). But if both types of punishment are possible, sign 
[aLtawo] is indeterminant . 
ln summary, our point here is not that this de rivative 
or that derivative has a particular sign, but instead that the 
properties of reduced form equations rest ultimately upon 
the structure of the underlying model and are in general 
much too subtle to be specified in an ad hoc manner. 
Summmy and Conclusions 
In this paper we have attempted to introduce the 
reader to an interesting class of models which appear in 
economic theory. These models are qualitative in nature and 
are based upon the opt imizing behavior of the individual 
agent. Obviously, the rob ustness of such models varies 
inversely with the number of preference restlictions (res-
trictions on U)used in the analysis. The fewer the restrictions 
the wider is the class of agents to which the model is ap-
plicable and accordingly the more confident one is in 
derived results. For example, the fact that aLjap < 0 
whether penalties are fines or a mix of fines and sentences 
and independent of all preference restrictions except be-
havior consistent with the axioms of the expected utili ty 
theorem, provides a fairly strong foundation upon which 
to base policy. At the same time, one could not recommend 
increasing fines as a deterrent to arson with the same degree 
of confidence, al though the assumptions upon which this 
resul t rests (in the fines-only penalty system ) seem to be 
quite reasonable. 
Ultimately, this model, like all others in science, is 
interesting only if the deduced properties of the reduced 
form are empirically verifiable . Here the prob lem of veri-
fication amounts to estimating the reduced fo rm via re-
gression analysis or some other estimation technique, and 
then calculating whether the partial derivatives of the es-
timated equation are sta tis tically significant and of the 
24 Notice tha t under the post ulated circumstances, if one unwitting-
ly made the seemin gly plausible assumpt ion that aL/dw0 < 0, one 
ends up with a cont radiction. That is, in this situation a L/dwo <o 
is inconsis tent with behavior according to the ex pected utility 
theorem. (Of co urse, aL/dwo < 0 will be consistent with behavio r 
under some hypothesis.) 
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correct sign. We hasten to add that the process of estima-
tion will force the investigator to m ake an assumption 
about the class of functio ns to which (3) belongs. Care 
must be exercised to insure the class chosen is consistent 
with the underlying model. 
As is no doubt obvious by now , both the strength and 
weakness of utility analysis stem from the generality of the 
approach . As the number of arguments in U increases so 
does the d ifficulty of obtain ing unambiguous resul ts . Suc-
cessful applicat ion of this technique depends heavily upon 
ingenuity in transforming plausible behavioral hypotheses 
into meaningful restrictions on utility functions. 
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